People always show up to protest at the national conventions of the Democratic and Republican Parties. The protests span the political spectrum, often including local and national issues. In looking through old reports for the second edition of The Politics of Protest, Amanda Pullum and I found protest at almost every major party convention in a presidential election year between 1948-2012. I bet there’s even more now.

The attractions for carrying signs and chanting in the streets–or more–are very clear. Usually located in major cities, it’s relatively easy to generate crowds and, more importantly, attention. Delegates include party activists, elected officials, and aspiring candidates for office. They are obvious targets and, sometimes, potential allies.

But the local audience is the least of it. Media outlets of all sorts swarm the national conventions looking for news and usually there isn’t much. Although party conventions are charged with selecting candidates for the presidency and vice presidency, since 1972 the nominees are well-known in advance. Reporters looking for stories might drift outside and see protesters for (or against) abortion rights, civil rights, immigration reform, organized labor, and peace, and war–and so much else.

Protesters demonstrate their concerns and their commitments, projecting everything to a broad national and international audience. They attack the Party opposing their positions, and demand the Party closer do more. And movements are far more likely to engage with distant audiences than those wearing funny hats inside.

And there’s a paradox here: Although the people inside the convention hall are better positioned to make policy, they are least likely to be responsive to pressure from most campaigns. By the time the national conventions take place, delegates and candidates are far more concerned with the November election and imagined swing voters than persistent opponents or putative allies in the streets.

The Chicago protests at the Democratic Convention of 1968 focused on the Vietnam War more than anything else, and one reason they were so disruptive and dramatic and dangerous was activist frustration at being unable to influence what was going on inside. Party insiders chose Vice President Hubert Humphrey as their nominee. Humphrey had difficulty sketching out a clear position on the war while demonstrating fealty to President Lyndon Johnson and had skipped all of the primaries. Activists locked out of the convention focused their efforts–and their rage–outside.

After the Chicago debacle, both parties executed reforms of the primary process that guaranteed issue activists more meaningful influence much earlier in the process.

By the convention, partisan positions are pretty clear, and leaders work to blur those that might hurt them at the polls.

Now look at the Gaza war–as demonstrators in Chicago urge. Protesters want the next president (and this one, as well) to put more pressure on Israel to stop the killing and reach some sort of settlement. They offer a range of remedies, from more forceful rhetoric to an embargo of arms to Israel.

President Joe Biden has adopted a policy mostly offering abundant arms and quite diplomacy to Israel, which clearly has been ineffective at ending the carnage. To the extent that we can derive a policy position from Donald Trump and the Republican Party, it’s one of more vigorous support of Israel.

In an electoral calculus, Democratic candidate Kamala Harris has every incentive to avoid a strong position on the issue. She called for a cease-fire months ago, and brokered meetings with the Israeli opposition to the Netanyahu government, but has been unwilling to risk a stronger stance.

Demonstrators will demand more from Harris, to be sure, but the real hope for influence is the audience watching from afar.

The prospects for influence in a presidential campaign are much better much earlier in the process.